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NIO No. 1203-76

23 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI

25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]
National Intelligence Officer for China
SUBJECT: Proposed Community Paper on the
Implications of Recent PRC Military
Activity in the Taiwan Strait Area

1. As a result of our meeting with the Director on 15 July, I have developed some specific suggestions for a community paper on Taiwan which would answer State's concern for greater specificity and DOD's concern that we are not worrying enough about what the PRC might do.

2. I suggest the title would be:

a. Implications of Recent PRC Military Activity in the Taiwan Strait Area.

b. The time frame would be 12 months.

c. The area covered would be the Taiwan area from the Senkakus to the Pratas Reef.

d. The countries analyzed would be the PRC and Taiwan.

e. The paper would be ready by mid September 1976 and DDI/OSR would pull it together.

3. I foresee the paper breaking down into three basic components:

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a. The first would examine carefully the facts of the recent unusual PRC military activity (much of which is still unclarified) to ensure that we have a full and accurate picture of what has been going on.

-- Put the activity in a proper military context to determine the extent to which the Taiwan Strait activity is part of a larger pattern and to identify those areas where it represents significant departures from past practice. This would include consideration of the gradual improvement of PRC coastal and other defense capability over the past several years, and developments since the issuance of Central Document 18. It would also cover the balance of forces and future trends. It would involve a careful comparison with other military exercises in recent years and it would seek to identify future patterns of PRC activity. DIA/DE would draft this section.

b. Set the activity within its political context, i.e., the PRC's strategy toward eventual reunification of Taiwan and the ROC's counter-strategy. Questions to look at should include: How might the PRC use force or the threat of force to further the process of reunification? What are the political constraints of relations with the US, USSR and other Asian nations on the PRC's possible threat or use of force? How might developments in China's succession struggle impact on its strategy toward Taiwan reunification? How might the ROC respond to any increased PRC military or political pressures? Would it be in the ROC's interest to provoke a military incident? What other types of action might the ROC take which could provoke the PRC? OCI or INR would draft this section.

-- Evaluate the potential for a PRC-ROC military incident, either accidental or intentional, taking into account both the political and military factors, and including information on patrolling practices and rules of engagement on both sides. DIA or OSR would draft this section.

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
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c. The final judgments of the paper could estimate the potential for conflict within a one-year period, but would be useful for calculating a more important trend over a longer period of time.



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SECRET

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NIO No. 1164-76

19 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI

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FROM: [REDACTED] National Intelligence Officer for China
SUBJECT: Proposed Community Paper on the Chances
of Hostilities on Taiwan

1. As a result of our meeting with the Director on 15 July, I have developed some specific suggestions for a community paper on Taiwan which would answer State's concern for greater specificity and DOD's concern that we are not worrying enough about what the PRC might do.

2. I suggest the title would be:

- a. The likelihood of hostilities between the PRC and ROC in the area of Taiwan.
- b. The time frame would be 12 months.
- c. The area covered would be the Taiwan area from the Senkakus to the Pratas Reef.
- d. The countries analyzed would be the PRC and Taiwan.
- e. The paper would be ready by mid September 1976 and DDI/OSR would pull it together.

3. I foresee two basic sections in the paper, a military section drafted by DIA/DE and a political section drafted by INR and/or OCI.

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a. The military section would cover PRC military strategy and tactics against Taiwan. This would include covering such topics as when has the PRC employed force or the threat of force in the past, and what clues does this provide for future actions?

b. Rules of engagement on both sides (PRC and ROC). What are the policies of the leadership on patrols, combat, retaliation? What could lead to a dust-up and what kind of a dust-up could lead to a greater conflict?

c. The current balance of forces and discernible trends which could influence future military action.

4. The political section would deal with both the constraints on and intentions of both sides. For instance, in the case of the PRC, we would deal with the constraints of the USSR military presence on the northern border and the PRC/US connection. The main constraint on the ROC side would probably be its military limitations. As for intentions, I believe we should analyze both PRC propaganda and private statements. On the ROC side, we should deal with intentions and include provocations from the ROC which could incite action by the PRC.



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